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THE PARADOX OF CONTRACTING IN
MARKETS
ROBERT E. SCOTT*
I
INTRODUCTION
Traditional economic analysis distinguishes economic organization along
three dimensions: firm, contract, and market. This categorization is misleading in
any number of respects, but none more so than the assumption that contract and
market are separate modes of exchange. In fact, other than barter, which is
almost unknown in contemporary commercial transactions, every market
transaction is implemented by contract. Thus, in markets the two modes of
exchange are inextricably combined.1 Moreover, the vast majority of contract
activity occurs in some form of market, so it does not require much loss of
generalization to say that not only are contracts in all markets, but markets are
also in all contracts. This implies that as markets change in character so too will
the contracts that are embedded in them. Economists have failed to appreciate
the implications of this integration of contract and market because of their naïve
and parsimonious conception of contract. But lawyers, too, have failed to
appreciate the tension between the fact that markets change the shape of contract
and the state’s commitment to a unitary regime of contract law. This failure to
understand the relationship between contract law and the central institutions of
economic organization has significant consequences. Among them is the failure
to recognize what I call the fundamental paradox of contracting in markets, the
topic that I take up in this Article.
To explain the paradox, I begin by distinguishing two quite different
economic objectives. The first objective is the goal of efficient market exchange
through contract—the process of designing contracts that motivate parties to
maximize the joint gains from transactions.2 The second quite distinct objective
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1. Ronald Coase defines markets as “institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist
to reduce the costs of carrying out exchange transactions.” RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 7 (1988). But of course, the same definition applies to contract as well.
2. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 544–45 (2003) (describing the goal of contract as “facilitat[ing] the efforts of contracting
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is the efficient production of contracts—the process of creating widely useful
terms and conditions that implement enforceable legal obligations. Much of law
and economics scholarship has been devoted to the first efficiency objective but,
until recently, the second has been virtually unexplored.3 Thus, we know a great
deal about how to design contracts to motivate parties to invest optimally in their
relationship, but very little about the shape-shifting process by which widely-used
contract terms that motivate investment are produced. Yet, that production
process is the source of the paradox of contracting in markets: as markets thicken
(more and more parties participate in the same or similar transactions), the
factors that generate efficiencies in the production of contracts—standardization
and economies of scale—are the same factors that produce inefficiencies in the
very contract terms that parties rely on to motivate performance. And, as with
any paradox, the reverse is true: the factors that produce more efficient contract
design—bespoke efforts to motivate investment and trade—are the same factors
that generate the loss of scale and the resulting inefficiencies in the production of
contracts.
Recognizing this paradox is the first step toward answering a central question
that remains unresolved: how can (and do) contracting parties in thick,
multilateral markets optimize between efficient production of contracts and
efficient contract design?4 The challenge is to exploit production efficiencies
without at the same time degrading the contract terms that motivate
performance. My claim is that the key to optimizing the activity of contracting in
thick markets requires overcoming a fundamental collective action problem
endemic to the production process: the private interests of the parties in these
markets diverge from their collective interests. Understanding how effective
coordination can create a functioning network to address the obsolescence that
is a byproduct of standardization has important normative implications. In
particular, it suggests that current approaches to consumer transactions that focus

parties to maximize the joint gains . . . from transactions” by solving the “canonical ‘contracting problem’
of ensuring both efficient ex post trade and efficient ex ante investment”).
3. Scholars of contract law have largely ignored the study of how contracts are produced—even
though assumptions about contract production and revision underlie many doctrines of contract
interpretation. For an example of an attempt to understand the production problem, see Stephen J. Choi,
Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1
(2017) (exploring how certain contracts are created and evolve over time). See also Robert Anderson &
Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017); Barak
Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (2011); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G.
Smith, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009); Kevin E. Davis, Interpreting Boilerplate
(N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 10-21, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618925 [https://perma.cc/SXJ7-78MG]; Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and
Incomplete Contracts (Working Paper, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3446206 [https://perma.cc/XXZ9-F5YH].
4. For my purposes, a market is thick when many parties participate in similar transactions and will
benefit from coordinated responses to the contracting environment. As I discuss in Part III, when markets
are thick in the sense that many actors face similar challenges in their dealings, the affected parties often
will institutionalize their innovative contract forms and terms through collective action. See infra text
accompanying notes 54–57.
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on the regulation of exploitative terms in bilateral contractual relations
misconceive the problem. Consumer contracts are made in large, multilateral
markets. Understanding the inherent inefficiencies of contracts in those markets
is the key to reframing the regulation of consumer transactions. State assistance
in overcoming collective action impediments in these markets is likely to be far
more efficacious than either unconscionability constraints on adhesion contracts5
or traditional command and control regulation of patently abusive terms.6
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets out the paradox of contracting in
markets in some detail. I first explain how parties in thin or bilateral contracting
markets optimize contracting costs by shifting resources between the transaction
costs of negotiating and drafting ex ante agreements and the expected litigation
costs of enforcing those contracts. This bespoke balancing of ex ante and ex post
contracting costs produces the most efficient transaction for the contracting cost.7
But as markets thicken, traders can exploit economies of scale in multilateral
contracting markets by standardizing the production of the contracts that govern
the exchange transaction.8 However, this standardization leads to inefficiencies
endemic to boilerplate: boilerplate terms are sticky, resistant to adaptation to
changed conditions, and subject to “black holes” that remain in the contract even
in the face of adverse legal consequences.9 I examine the ways in which obsolete
design has led to costly litigation in thick markets, particularly the markets for
sovereign and corporate bonds, where agency costs have impaired efforts to
revise obsolete contracts terms.
In Part III, I trace the different ways that some parties who trade in
multilateral markets have overcome the collective action problems that impede
more efficient contract design by creating a governance structure—or “spider”—
to organize their loose web of relationships. This focus on coordination and
cooperation conceives of the contracting parties in multilateral markets as
potential members of a commercial network with the capacity to share

5. The classic approach to the regulation of consumer contracts is through the application of the
unconscionability doctrine. Enshrined in U.C.C. § 2-302, and much admired by scholars who advocate
for consumer protection, unconscionability is framed as a single court reviewing ex post a single bilateral
contract between a consumer and a sophisticated seller and finding that a term (or terms) is the product
of “unfair surprise” and is “unreasonably unfavorable” to the consumer’s interests. For discussion, see
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 55–65 (2013).
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. I have referred to this balancing as the contracting parties’ attempt to maximize “the incentive
bang for the contracting-cost buck.” Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 823 (2006).
8. The distinction between bilateral contracting in thin markets and multilateral contracting in
thick markets is drawn more sharply in this Article than what we see in commercial contracting generally.
This stylization is designed to illustrate the differences in contracting practices that are my focus. Of
course, the reality is much less clear and the lines between the two markets are blurred. Perhaps the best
way to conceive of this distinction is to imagine that thin market bilateral contracting and thick market
multilateral contacting are poles of a continuum where many markets along the continuum exhibit
features of both.
9. I discuss these endemic inefficiencies further in Part II. See infra text accompanying notes 30–
35.
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information in important ways.10 I explore the different forms of network
organization from trade associations that function in low uncertainty
environments to supply chain networks that share information in more uncertain
settings.11 In some cases, however, high uncertainty renders parties incapable of
coordinating their network activities. The leafy green industry illustrates how in
this environment the state can facilitate coordination by helping to create a spider
for the network.
In Part IV, I turn to the normative question of how best to deal with the
problems of bad contract design in consumer markets. Consumer transactions
have long been a fraught subject for scholarly analysis. Many scholars continue
to view the regulation of consumer contracts through the lens of the bilateral
contracting market.12 Even when the focus properly shifts to multilateral markets,
few solutions to perceived inefficiencies have gained traction. Early efforts to
motivate disclosure have foundered on the multiplicity of terms in consumer
contracts, a form of information overload that prevents market forces from
eliminating inefficient terms. I argue that conceiving of consumers and their
sellers as a network without any spider offers a fresh perspective on why
conventional solutions to reducing the costs of inefficient (and exploitative)
contract terms have been unsuccessful. I conclude that a regulatory solution that
aids in organizing the network of buyers and sellers may better address the
problem of obsolete and encrusted contract terms in multilateral consumer
markets.13
II
THE PARADOX: EFFICIENT CONTRACT DESIGN OR EFFICIENT PRODUCTION
OF CONTRACTS
A. Bilateral Contracting: Bespoke Contract Design in Thin Markets
We observe successful efforts to design contracts efficiently in bespoke
transactions that are characteristic of thin markets where the actors are few and

10. Commercial networks are mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between formally
independent but functionally interdependent entities.
11. As I discuss in Part III, some networks deploy contractual mechanisms—whether in the form of
a master contract as in the case of a franchise or a manufacturing supply chain, or a bureaucratic structure
in the case of trade associations—that support network collaborations. These relationships have a “spider
in the web”—a controlling entity or hierarchy at the center of the network that facilitates network
formation and coordination. For discussion, see Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save
Fragile Spiderless Networks?, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018).
12. For examples of proposed common law contract developments that, despite their reform
attempts, still operate in the bilateral lens, see sources cited infra note 82.
13. Contract terms are obsolete in the sense I use here when they no longer (or never did) provide
appropriate incentives to parties to maximize joint value. Terms are encrusted when they are overlaid
with jargon in ways that undermines intelligibility. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 32–
39.
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scattered.14 In these circumstances, contracting occurs in bilateral relationships.
Here, the design goal is to weigh contracting costs against the incentive gains they
produce in achieving more efficient investment and trade. Thus, when markets
are thin and the level of uncertainty low, we see bespoke state contingent
contracting: explicit formal contracts between two parties that take the if-then
format made possible by low uncertainty. The thinness of the market removes
any scale economies from production efficiencies and justifies individualized
design strategies where parties shift contracting costs between front end
transaction costs and back end enforcement costs. It is the particular balancing
of front end and back end contracting costs that optimizes contractual
incentives.15 In this bilateral contracting environment, low uncertainty allows
contract designers to anticipate and address (most of) the future states of the
world and specify what should happen in each possible state.
Contract design in bilateral relationships also adjusts to higher levels of
uncertainty.16 As uncertainty increases, efforts to craft fully state contingent
contracts come under pressure. Parties in bilateral markets then turn to more
flexible relational contracts that pair discretion in how explicit obligations are
fulfilled as events evolve through the use of standards that govern key terms such
as price, quantity, and effort.17 In long-term procurement agreements, for
example, the cost of formalizing anticipated contingencies and specifying their
consequences is high. Here, the reality of an uncertain future motivates the
parties to reach agreement on contextualized standards that permit quantity and
price to be adjusted as circumstances change over time.18 Distribution contracts
are another example of the efficiency advantages of coupling an explicit
statement of obligation with a standard that gives discretion over how the
obligation is fulfilled. These contracts often require distributors to use their “best
14. Bespoke transactions are tailor-made contracts designed to fit the requirements of a single
transaction or transaction type.
15. Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 817.
16. This transformation in the nature of contract as uncertainty increases highlights the distinction
between risk and uncertainty that Frank Knight identified almost a century ago. See generally FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). In Knight’s usage, there is risk when alternative
future states of the world occur with quantifiable probability: The future can be expressed as a probability
distribution. But under uncertainty, too little is known about these eventualities to anticipate precise
risks and their probability. The Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty is a useful way to
illustrate the way accelerating technology and global competition have created unique circumstances that
resist probabilistic classification.
17. Allowing flexibility (or discretion) in relational contracts saves parties the transaction costs from
continually having to update or renegotiate price or quantity in light of changed external circumstances.
A further advantage of a flexible relational contract is that it permits the parties to “smooth the bumps”
in the inevitable variations in supply and demand that otherwise may threaten short term business
disruption. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 562–65.
18. The standards in procurement agreements are not free floating; they are contextualized to the
particular transaction. For example, a buyer cannot demand (nor can a seller produce) a quantity that is
“unreasonably disproportionate” to the quantities the parties themselves traded in prior periods. U.C.C.
§ 2-306(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Courts adjudicate disproportion by anchoring
on the parties’ experience under the contract. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common
Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2016).
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efforts” (or similar standards) in performing the contract.19 Such standards often
are preceded by instructions that contextualize the broad standard.20 For
example, parties may describe the relevant industry or product context and, when
possible, the evidence the court should use to measure performance under the
standard.21 Alternatively, the contract may provide a list of specific actions the
agent is required to undertake as exemplars of behavior that meet the best efforts
standard.22 In either case, a reviewing court can infuse content into a best efforts
(or similar) standard by inferring the parties’ general goals from the contract’s
descriptive clauses and detailed rules.23
Unfortunately, even formal legal standards that provide instructions to a
court cannot easily regulate either the renegotiation or the adjustment processes
because the parties’ expectations of the litigation outcome, and not a court’s
judgement, shape these processes. Here, parties to relational contracts can (and
do) rely on the trust created by repeated opportunities to mutually adjust as the
future unfolds.24 Thus, optimal contract design in this context motivates
performance both through the threat of formal legal enforcement and through
informal or self-enforcing mechanisms, including reputational sanctions, the loss
of future dealings, and social norms of trust and reciprocity.
Technological change has raised the level of uncertainty in bilateral
contracting ever higher and, consequently, more complex collaborative

19. See CORI Contracts Library, UNIV. OF MO.-COLUMBIA CONTRACTING & ORGS. RESEARCH
INST., https://cori.missouri.edu/ [https://perma.cc/YQ5N-QWVH] (showing that 4,328 out of the 24,965
contracts in the CORI database have “best efforts” terms, or 17.34% of the total).
20. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 851–56 (discussing how parties contextualize standards to
fit their circumstances).
21. For an example, see the “purpose” clause from the Fountain Manufacturing Agreement
between Apple Computer, Inc. and SCI Systems, Inc., http://contracts.onecle.com/apple/
scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [https://perma.cc/XZ9J-DQ6A]. See also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel &
Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23,
58–60 (2014) (describing how sophisticated parties design contracts to guide judicial interpretation).
22. See, e.g., Distribution Agreement between Microblend LLC and Mobil Oil Corp. (June 6, 1998)
(on file with author) (listing specific actions constituting best efforts, including “providing
demonstrations of the Products to potential customers; assisting in discharging seller’s obligation under
its warranties relating to the Product; submitting, at least thirty days prior to the start of each calendar
quarter, a quarterly forecast for the upcoming six months; assisting in determining the credit worthiness
of any distributor; and otherwise assisting in the sale and marketing of the Product as the parties may
from time to time agree”).
23. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 851–56 (reporting the results of a sample of contracts that
combine standards with rules so as to contextualize the standard). Where the parties combine standards
and rules that relate to the same subject matter, the ejusdem generis canon applies. The meaning of the
general language is then limited to matters similar in kind or classification to the enumerated precise
terms. See, e.g., Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938) (holding that an enumeration which included
“any horse, mule, cattle, hog, sheep, or goat” excluded turkeys).
24. In many contexts, reputation, repeat dealings, and norms of reciprocity provide the best
available means of regulating the inevitable renegotiation and adjustment process so as to reduce the risk
of exploitation of the parties’ vulnerabilities. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long Term
Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987) (exploring how social and contractual norms facilitate mutual
cooperation and mitigate information and enforcement deficiencies between parties).
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agreements have emerged.25 These new agreements move beyond the
rudimentary linking of explicit and implicit obligations seen in the long-term
procurement and distributorship agreements discussed previously. In these
collaborative (or framework) agreements, the formal elements of the contract are
designed to facilitate the growth of trust that, in turn, regulates the substantive
elements of the parties’ relationship. A formal governance structure induces the
cooperative behaviors that are formally braided with explicit obligations.26 In
these contracts, the trust that results from mutual opportunities for adjustment
not only signals the counterparties’ willingness to cooperate, but also their
capability to adapt to an uncertain future.
In all of these bespoke settings, where design choices are influenced primarily
by the level of uncertainty, the costs of contracting are assessed only by reference
to the incentive gains produced in that particular transaction. An appropriate
analogy is the relationship between the costs of crafting a beautiful piece of
furniture by hand and the value to be derived from its sale to an appreciative
buyer. But those considerations are inapt once the market for furniture of this
style increases and the cabinetmaker can now contemplate making many sales of
similarly designed pieces to many buyers. When markets thicken and scale
economies can be realized—both in the underlying economic good and the
contract that regulates the trade—the cost of producing any given contract
becomes economically relevant. It is in these multilateral contracting
environments that efficient contract design gives way to efficient production of
contracts.
B. The Efficient Production of Contracts in Thick Markets
Producing contracts more efficiently in multilateral markets reduces
production costs and creates value that is shared between the market
participants. Contract production efficiencies result primarily from the
standardization of contract terms that are enabled by economies of scale. In thick
markets where there is scale in the production of an economic good, standardized
contract terms facilitate the scaling of the associated contracts as well.
Standardization reduces the transaction costs of formulating the terms that
embody the legal rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Providing
contract drafters a menu of incentive compatible terms from which they can
choose greatly simplifies and reduces the costs of contracting. Moreover, the
improvement in production efficiency caused by standardization goes far beyond
the additional resource costs saved by not individually drafting the terms for each
contract. Standardized terms bring to bear a collective wisdom and experience of
25. For discussion of these collaborative contracts and contracting for innovation more generally,
see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009).
26. For a discussion of the interplay between the formal governance structure and the informal
bonds of trust that it generates through iterative exchanges of information between the parties, see
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010).

FINAL - SCOTT (DO NOT DELETE)

78

6/26/2020 4:00 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 83:71

ways to avoid mistakes in formulating terms that parties could not generate
individually. The unique benefits of standardization derive from the process by
which standard formulations of terms evolve and gain a distinct, recognized, and
consistent meaning within the market. This evolutionary process tests
combinations of terms for dangerous but latent defects. Over time, the
consequences of standard formulations are observable over a wide range of
transactions, permitting the removal of ambiguities and inconsistencies. In this
way, mature standardized terms become validated by experience and are
therefore safer than new and innovative formulations of terms.27
Standardized terms that become boilerplate in multilateral markets also
reduce learning costs by providing a uniform system of communication. Contract
terms that have been used over a long period of time become familiar. Thanks to
repeated use, terms that have flaws are better understood and uncertainties are
eliminated. Terms that survive this quasi-Darwinian trial and error process
become mature terms whose risks and performance characteristics are well
known and understood by market participants. In this way, both market
participants and courts develop an understanding and confidence in the reliability
of these terms. This high level of understanding then reduces the risk of
erroneous interpretation by a court. In this sense, these terms are “battle tested.”
Using standard language in any given contract thus has social benefits that are
external to that contract: repetition reduces the cost that others must expend in
learning the meaning of the clause.28
Network externalities may also operate in the case of standard contract terms.
Contract terms that are used more often and more widely will be priced by a
larger number of market actors. As a consequence, the price for universally used
terms will be more accurate. By contrast, there will be greater uncertainty about
the value of contract terms that are idiosyncratic to a few users. Liquidity is a
crucial characteristic of financial instruments such as bonds that trade in
multilateral markets, but liquidity will suffer when individual bonds within a set
have different contract terms whose particular risks need to be separately
evaluated and estimated. Since ease and speed of pricing are important in fastmoving markets, traders will avoid buying products that require costly
consultation in order to determine their value.29

27. See TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE § 1.02 (2003)
(observing that provisions that have been used repeatedly develop a “hallowed status”—they have now
been blessed). For discussions of how boilerplate terms become resistant to change, see Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
28. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 27, at 763–64.
29. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757, 785–89 (1995).
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C. The Dilemma: Efficient Production Produces Sub-Optimal Contract Terms
Standardization in the production of boilerplate is, however, a double-edged
sword: the efficiencies that reduce the costs of producing contracts are the very
source of the contracts’ inefficiencies. Standard-form or boilerplate contract
terms are very different from the optimal terms in a bespoke commercial
contract. The certainty that standardization imparts to the market limits the
ability of contract drafters in multilateral markets to draft vague standards
designed to give discretion to courts to determine contractual rights ex post.
Drafters thus are functionally incapable of shifting contracting costs from the
front end of the contracting process to the back end as they do when designing
bespoke contracts in bilateral markets.30 This limitation puts even more pressure
on drafters to produce standardized terms ex ante that will motivate parties to
invest and trade efficiently.
But standardized terms inevitably fit individual deals less perfectly than
situation-specific tailored agreements. The risk of contractual ambiguity or
indeterminacy is greater than with a tailored contract because the fit with any
individual transaction is necessarily imperfect. This linguistic uncertainty
challenges courts whenever they are asked to interpret a standard provision in a
commercial contract and determine what the parties understood that provision
to mean when they contracted.31 Indeed, some standardized terms in boilerplate
contracts may have lost any recoverable meaning—thus creating what my coauthors and I have called a contractual black hole.32 Here, courts may be
practically incapable of inferring the parties’ intended meaning of the
standardized term when they drafted the contract.
Unfortunately, the very elements of fixed and unchanging meaning that make
standardized terms attractive are the same elements that can contribute to the
erosion of that meaning over time. In addition to the ordinary risks of
obsolescence, the repetitious use of boilerplate has two pernicious effects that
render the life span of an efficient boilerplate term needlessly short. The first
effect is “rote usage.” Over time, some standardized terms get used by rote so
consistently that they lose their original meaning. In effect, they are victims of
contractual overkill. Nonetheless, the terms may continue to be employed
because parties see no reason to incur a risk, however small, of jeopardizing the
30. An illustration of the difficulty of drafting standards in multilateral markets for courts to
interpret ex post is the largely futile efforts of parties seeking to have courts enforce the ubiquitous
material adverse change clause (MAC) in merger and acquisition contracts. The MAC is designed as a
standard term that will permit in multilateral markets the acquirer to abandon the merger in light of
specified events that occur after signing but before the deal closes. To date, only one court has found a
material adverse change sufficient to trigger a MAC and justify the acquirer backing out of a merger deal.
See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018). The effect of courts’ reluctance to find
a MAC is that the clause functionally becomes a standardized “no MAC” term in the contract.
31. The interpretive goal in contract cases is to recover and then enforce the parties’ apparent
intentions as they existed at the time of contract. Intention “is determined objectively and prospectively:
A party is taken to mean what its contract partner could plausibly believe it meant when the parties
contracted.” Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 568–69.
32. For discussion, see Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 3, at 38.
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understood meaning of their agreement.33 “Encrustation” is a second cost of
excessive repetition: the intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly as
legal jargon is overlaid on standard linguistic formulations.34 Rote usage and
encrustation are related phenomena, although they may be found independently
in boilerplate terms. When combined in a particular clause or phrase, a term
becomes linguistically uncertain: no particular meaning can be uncovered that is
more probable than any other meaning. Terms that are linguistically uncertain in
this sense are not ambiguous, but rather are hopelessly vague. The term in
question can apply to an infinitely wide spectrum of referents.35
What is the mechanism that produces encrustation in standard boilerplate?
Anecdotal evidence from interviews with lawyers who draft standardized
contracts suggests the following process.36 Drafting lawyers use market standardforms as far as possible. But the contract must also be tailored to the client’s
needs. The drafters must change names, dates, locations for payment, terms of
trade, and other transactional details from the deal document being used as a
template. Yet lawyers working with standard-form language that has been
repeated by rote for many years often lack understanding of the contemporary
purpose(s) served by boilerplate terms. Lawyers drafting marginal modifications
to fit the goals of a transaction while ignorant of the contemporary function of
the contract’s boilerplate terms will often add legal jargon in an effort to clarify
the boilerplate. These insertions can occur with greater frequency when the
drafting lawyers have little experience with the particular boilerplate terms.
Encrustation can thus result from repeated efforts to clarify standard language
whose contemporary meaning is unclear to the drafter.37 The encrustation
process ultimately weakens the communicative properties of boilerplate terms,
reducing their reliability as signals of the parties’ true intentions.38 Nevertheless,
widespread use of the encrusted clauses continues, even after they cease to have
much or any substantive content, because rote repetition identifies them as the
standard terms that are present in all such contracts.39
Whenever boilerplate terms lose some or all of their original meaning, either
through obsolescence or encrustation, there is a heightened risk that courts may
33. Goetz & Scott, supra note 27, at 288–89.
34. Id.
35. Linguistic uncertainty is distinct from the more familiar interpretive challenges courts face when
interpreting terms that are ambiguous. A term is ambiguous when it is “capable of more than one sensible
and reasonable interpretation.” Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. Oregon ex rel. Transp. Comm’n Highway Div.
650 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
36. This description is drawn from Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 3, at 10.
37. To be sure, alterations may occur in other contexts as well. But there are greater error-correction
mechanisms for those boilerplate terms that do have understood meaning and frequent usage. Drafters
will be less likely to adopt changes in terms with understood meanings and usage if the additions changed
this meaning and usage. Where a term has lost meaning and become a black hole, these error-correcting
mechanisms will not apply.
38. Philip Wood has described the process of encrustation as akin to that of barnacles accumulating
on a ship’s hull. PHILIP WOOD, LIFE AFTER LEHMAN: CHANGES IN MARKET PRACTICE 9 (2009).
39. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 3, at 10.
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be persuaded to adopt an unanticipated interpretation of the term(s) at issue that
misconceives the ex ante bargain between the parties to the contract. A standard
assumption is that the inefficiencies caused by this judicial error will be limited
to an isolated case of an aberrant interpretation because sophisticated
commercial parties can, and are motivated to, readily correct a court’s
interpretive mistakes. Indeed, given the important role that standardization plays
in replicating boilerplate terms in tens of thousands of commercial contracts in
multilateral markets, and the non-trivial possibility that a court may err in
interpreting terms that are obsolete or encrusted, commercial parties have strong
incentives to ensure that their standardized contract terms are continually
revised. Updating standard terms in multilateral markets is essential to ensuring
that a common meaning is preserved, one that efficiently motivates the parties to
invest and trade.
Despite the plausibility of the foregoing assumption, there is mounting
evidence that parties in some multilateral markets fail to react to (apparent)
judicial errors in interpreting boilerplate terms and are unable readily to convert
boilerplate into new and intelligible formulations.40 Daunting collective action
problems appear to impair the efforts of parties in these markets to clarify the
meaning of encrusted boilerplate terms. Inertia results from several costs that
collectively deter any individual participant in a multilateral market from revising
standard terms. For example, any revision in a standard deal threatens to put the
unchanged terms in earlier deals at greater risk, and revisions increase the risk of
an unanticipated judicial interpretation of the new term as well. There is also
uncertainty about the reaction to a revised contract term by potential traders in
the market: participants in multilateral markets express strong preferences for a
standard package of terms.41 Revising a term undermines standardization and
necessarily increases the learning costs for potential traders. Since the production
of network externalities is a primary virtue of standard-form contracts, it follows
that standardized contract terms may be slow to change, even after market
participants identify costly ambiguities.42 Meanwhile, the inefficiencies caused by
linguistically uncertain boilerplate may not be fully priced by the market. The
result is that arbitrage opportunities remain for market traders who can identify

40. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or
Random Mutation?, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2017).
41. Elizabeth de Fontenay, Josefin Meyer & Mitu Gulati, The Sovereign Debt Listing Puzzle, (Duke
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 2017–4, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2853917 [https://perma.cc/7ZLA-JZE4]; Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati,
How Much is This Clause: Debt Managers on Pricing Bond Contract Terms, (Duke Law Sch. Working
Paper, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2830445 [https://perma.cc/4N7CC75C]. This suggests that contract terms are far more endogenous than is typically assumed in models of
contract where individual purchasers and sellers are assumed to come to the market with their individual
preferences that are independent of other traders.
42. For discussion, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 27. The problem of persistent linguistic
uncertainties can in theory be eliminated by a coordinating agency such as an industry association. See
infra Part III.B.
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uncertain meanings and then exploit those uncertainties in litigation, thereby
capturing a greater share of the underlying contractual rights.
The phenomenon of uncertainties in standard-form contracts attracting the
attention of professional contract arbitrageurs has played out vividly over recent
years in the context of sovereign debt litigation.43 The most recent and salient
example occurred in 2016, when Argentina settled with arbitrageurs who
successfully held out from a restructuring offer after asserting a novel
interpretation of the ubiquitous pari passu clause found in almost all sovereign
debt contracts.44 The settlement gave the holdouts staggering recoveries on the
bonds that they had purchased in the secondary market.45 The pari passu
litigation suggests that the process of modifying boilerplate terms to correct for
ambiguities or uncertainties can take years. It also shows that the process can
prove enormously costly, particularly in this case given the hundreds of billions
of dollars of bonds with suboptimal contract terms that were issued in the interim
period that extended more than three years.46
There is an obvious solution to the impediments preventing individual traders
in multilateral markets from revising the obsolete terms that are the inevitable
byproduct of production efficiencies in contracting. Consider the sovereign bond
market as an example: if the market participants acted together, they could
overcome many of these inertia costs. The market could coordinate to create a
network of traders who would collectively advance a new market standard with
a clear interpretation of its meaning and purpose. This collective action would
create a new standard acceptable to market traders, one that reduced legal
uncertainty about the interpretation of the new standard and minimized the risk

43. Contractual arbitrage has become a lucrative business in sovereign debt markets. For a further
discussion of the rise of this form of arbitrage, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott,
Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Eric Brousseau et
al. eds., 2020) (forthcoming).
44. Holdouts from Argentina’s efforts to restructure its debt claimed that the pari passu clause,
which provided that “the bonds rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all of the Issuer’s
present and future unsubordinated External Indebtedness,” was an inter-creditor agreement that entitled
a creditor who was not paid its pro rata share to an injunction against other creditors who were paid that
share. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 3, at 27. Bonds worth many billions of dollars were sold with the
litigated language unchanged for years after the first challenge by the holdouts was mounted. Id. at 23.
45. Katia Porzecanski, Singer Makes 369% of Principal on Argentine Bonds in Debt Offer,
BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-01/singer-makes-369of-principal-on-argentine-bonds-in-debt-offer [https://perma.cc/S7M7-8J5M]; see also Martin Guzman,
An Analysis of Argentina’s 2001 Default Resolution (Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation, Working
Paper No. 1010, 2016).
46. Relatively few changes were made to the pari passu boilerplate for over three years after federal
courts in New York endorsed the ratable payments interpretation in the litigation involving Argentina
(and roughly fifteen years after a similar decision in Brussels involving Peru). This is so even though the
drafting lawyers, and the entire sovereign bond industry, were nearly unanimous in condemning the
series of judicial decisions that permitted the contractual arbitrage strategies of the holdout creditors to
prevail. The key decisions were NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012);
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2011 WL 9522565 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011); Elliott
Assocs. v. Republic of Peru 2000/QR/92 (Ct. App. Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000).
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that courts would draw a negative inference about the meaning of the existing
stock of old clauses.
But coordinating the efforts of participants in multilateral markets to create
a functioning network is challenging. In a recent study, my co-authors and I
compared the speed with which obsolete terms are revised in private equity
driven merger and acquisition transactions with public company bond issues.47
Both types of contracts contained a standard No Recourse clause that had
become obsolete over time with the introduction of limited liability under state
corporate law. More recently, however, a series of prominent cases limited the
protections of the standard No Recourse provision to issues of contract liability.
This left shareholders vulnerable to liability claims based on tort and other
equitable theories. The emerging case law should have motivated parties in both
markets to modify the obsolete clause to better protect against these noncontractual claims. Yet the vast majority of the corporate bond contracts have
continued to use the standard No Recourse clause, unchanged from the 1880s,
confirming the difficulty of revising terms in large multilateral markets.48 By
contrast, over fifty percent of the private equity contracts were revised following
a series of industry meetings in 2012, where senior lawyers exhorted their
colleagues to reform their clauses.49 Indeed, focusing just on the private equity
deals done by the top five law firms in the industry, every contract after 2012 has
been revised.50
This evidence suggests that change in the private equity contracts occurred
when the market was able to coordinate on a standard revision, and that the top
law firms were well positioned to affect that coordination. By coalescing around
a standard revision to the No Recourse clause, these firms overcame the
reluctance of individual lawyers to change the language unilaterally. But lacking
such a coordinating mechanism, corporate bond contracts continue to use an
obsolete No Recourse term, one that now carries a significant litigation risk.
These findings indicate that there are stark variations in the speed of revision
across markets.
The comparison between the smaller private equity market and the larger
corporate bond market illustrates a critical difference between two types of
multilateral markets. In some markets, contracting parties have devised
mechanisms—whether in the form of a master contract as in the case of franchises
or a bureaucratic structure in the case of trade associations—that support interparty collaborations. Much like the coordinating role of the leading law firms in
merger and acquisition transactions, we can best understand the relationships

47. Stephen J. Choi, Robert E. Scott & Mitu Gulati, Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private
and Public Company Transactions, 2020 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (Columbia Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 611, 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3467350 [https://perma.cc/UN2FGF8Z].
48. Id. (manuscript at 21).
49. Id. (manuscript at 23).
50. Id. (manuscript at 25).
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among the parties to these kinds of multilateral contracts as mutual cooperators
in a commercial network that has a “spider in the web”—a controlling entity or
hierarchy at the center of the network that maintains stability and facilitates
revisions in standardized contract terms.51 In contrast, the sovereign and
corporate bond markets lack any centralizing spider to mandate changes in
contract language. This coordination failure explains why no changes have
occurred in the language of the No Recourse clause in the corporate bond context
and why changes occurred only after many years in the case of the pari passu
clause in Argentina’s bonds. The individual interests of the key market
participants in these markets are inconsistent with their collective interests,52 and
the diverse parties and their interest groups are constrained from acting unless
and until they can assemble the critical mass of players to coordinate on the best
way to revise the obsolete terms.53
III
ADDRESSING THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM THROUGH NETWORKS
In Part II, I argued that standard-form contracts in multilateral markets
predictably contain obsolete and encrusted terms that undermine contractual
incentives. These inefficiencies are an inevitable byproduct of the efficient
production of standardized contract terms in these large-scale markets. Although
in theory commercial parties are motivated to revise inefficient terms, significant
barriers to collective action often prevent or substantially delay individual efforts

51. The market for derivatives is another example of parties devising a hierarchy that functions to
update contract terms in light of changed conditions. The International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) frequently updates the ISDA Master Contract. The ISDA Determination
Committees are a central authority to make official, binding determinations regarding the existence of
“credit events” and “succession events” (such as mergers), which may trigger obligations under a credit
default swap contract. For discussion of the history of the formation of the derivatives network, see
Jeffery B. Golden, Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation, 13 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 18
(1994); Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions within the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211 (2001).
52. In the sovereign bond case, the private interests of the lawyers, their clients (the sovereigns’ debt
managers), and the investment banks were to minimize the ex ante costs of a bond issue (transaction
costs plus price discounts), even where expected ex post costs (restructuring cost, the cost of holdouts,
and so forth) were thereby increased by an even greater amount. In contrast, the collective interests of
the same parties were to protect the “industry” and the market for sovereign bonds so that future
issuances proceeded smoothly and future business could grow. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT,
THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT
DESIGN 140–51 (2012).
53. Change ultimately did occur in the case of the Argentine bonds, but not until three years after
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an interpretation of the pari passu clause that put all future
efforts to restructure the Argentine bonds at risk. Revision to the pari passu clause had to be “settled”
among the key parties, since private interests demanded “standard” legal terms that minimized the ex
ante costs of placing the bonds in the market. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 43, at 12–14. Coordination
did not occur, therefore, until a conference at Columbia Law School in early October 2014 gathered the
key parties together. Id. The Columbia meeting appeared to make clear to those present that
coordination attempts were not proceeding smoothly and the result was a subsequent meeting of the key
players at the offices of the New York Federal Reserve Bank at which coordination did occur. Id. at 18.
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to repair latent defects in the standard terms. But the parties to multilateral
contracts are not isolated dyads in a bespoke transaction: their participation in
this larger market motivates them to seek a means of coordinating with others in
the market who are similarly bound to the standardized terms. In this Part, I
explore ways in which parties in certain multilateral markets have overcome
coordination impediments by forming functioning networks designed to solve
common problems.
A. Solving Common Problems in Multilateral Markets Through Networks
Commercial networks are mechanisms for coordination and cooperation
between formally independent but functionally interdependent entities. They
provide parties in multilateral markets indispensable cognitive resources—
knowledge about the world and its possibilities—and frameworks for addressing
coordination problems that can reduce the costs of conventional forms of
standardized contracting.54 Parties in thick markets have limited information
about the universe of possible partners. It follows that it is worthwhile to search
for potential partners who know, or might quickly discover, solutions a single
party could not reach alone.55 However, potentially successful collaborators
would struggle to find one another without the information that commercial
networks provide.56 The more extensive and dense an initial network of
connections, the higher the chances of finding promising partners. Viewed from
the vantage point of the candidate partner rather than the party searching for a
collaborator, the better connected you are, or the more central your position in a
relevant network, the more likely you are to be found, and the better your
chances of entering a new collaboration aimed at coordinating on collective
goals.57
It is appropriate, therefore, to conceive of the diverse contracting parties in
multilateral markets as potential members of a network of collaborators
empowered to solve coordination and collective action problems. All of the
participants in the market stand to be harmed by the inefficiencies of
standardization, yet no single party can successfully update standard terms as
conditions change or adjust to aberrant judicial interpretations of ossified
54. See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 563 (2016).
55. Networks that form to obtain information about potential partners, including most famously the
bio-tech collaborations in Silicon Valley, have been widely studied by organizational sociologists. See,
e.g., Walter W. Powell, Kenneth Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Inter-Organizational Collaboration and
the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116 (1996); Walter
W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 197 (1996).
56. For discussion, see AVINASH DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES
OF GOVERNANCE (2004) (showing how the potential for reputation-based exchange diminishes with
distance, whether physical or social).
57. For discussion, see generally Yves L. Doz, The Evolution of Cooperation in Strategic Alliances:
Initial Conditions or Learning Processes?, 17 STRAT. MGMT. J. 55 (1996); Bruce Kogut, A Study of the
Life Cycle of Joint Ventures, 28 MGMT. INT. REV. 39 (1988).
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boilerplate. By forming a network, the parties in multilateral markets can
collectively ameliorate these inefficiencies.
B. Two Prototypes: Trade Associations and Supply Chains
There are several multilateral markets where the need to optimize the
tradeoff between efficient contract production and efficient contractual
incentives has motivated the creation of networks that collectivize the contracting
process. Scholars have long observed organized networks of cooperatives and
trade associations where members collectivize the contracting process by
providing standard contract terms that are updated as conditions change and
enforced through a private dispute settlement regime. Lisa Bernstein’s
interesting work on the cotton and grain industries is one such example.58 In the
cotton industry, dealers in cotton and cotton mills have, since the 1920s, adopted
standard contracts governing transactions between association members that are
periodically updated by the trade association. Arbitration panels, which have the
benefit of deep knowledge of the form contract and of industry practices, resolve
disputes among members.59 The combination of low uncertainty in these markets
and the continually updated industry standard contracts has resulted in a
collective equivalent of state contingent contracts—a contract that is continually
updated in response to changed conditions that could not be anticipated ex
ante—and a pattern of very low rates of arbitration.60
Networks have also evolved to capture scale economies in manufacturing
supply chains.61 Unlike the trade association pattern, here the level of uncertainty
makes the development of highly specified standardized contracts unworkable.
Consider the auto industry, for example, where uncertainty-driven disruption has
led over the past fifty years to vertical disintegration and the development of
58. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law in the Cotton Industry]; see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996) (discussing rules
of the National Grain and Feed Association, which require that all disputes among members must be
submitted to the Association’s arbitration system).
59. Dealers in cotton have jointly adopted the Southern Mill Rules to govern transactions between
their members. The Rules are revised annually, and changes are announced at annual meetings and
widely circulated. Both trade associations have established a joint arbitration panel to hear all disputes
under the Rules (except those concerning quality, which are referred to a separate body). Annual review
by the trade associations assures that regularities in trade practice that contribute to generally beneficial
outcomes are identified and incorporated into the Rules. As Bernstein notes, “given the amount of detail
in the trade rules, cases involving contractual gaps are uncommon.” Bernstein, Private Commercial Law
in the Cotton Industry, supra note 58, at 1736. In fact, given the clarity and comprehensive character of
the rules, disputes of any kind under the rules are infrequent. Id.
60. This efficient capture of scale economies is critically dependent, however, on the low level of
uncertainty. In the post-2011 period, when the volatility of cotton prices jumped significantly, contract
breaches between farmers and merchants and merchants and mills increased substantially, as did
recourse to the formal arbitration procedure. Michael Rothfeld & Carolyn Cui, Plague of Broken
Contracts Frays Cotton Market, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10000872396390444772404577589611222756168 [https://perma.cc/JYT6-MS4V].
61. For discussion, see generally Bernstein, supra note 54.
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bilateral collaborative supply chain contracts.62 That shift, in turn, has created a
demand in the market for information about potential partner-suppliers. As an
exemplar of the changes in the industry, a collaborative contract has emerged
between General Motors (GM) and its suppliers that specifies an iterative
process designed to produce information about the counterparty’s skills before
commitments are made to produce or purchase anything.63 The cost of this switch
to collaborative contracts, however, has been a loss of scale in information
gathering: knowledge about the capacity of each potential supply partner can be
gathered only through iterative exchange, one partner at a time. The upshot is
that GM and the other original equipment manufacturers of supply chain
networks have developed a way to scale the production of information about
potential suppliers. By facilitating the sharing of information gained in the
bilateral contracts that govern the links in the new supply chains, important
elements of information production shift, in part, from bilateral to multilateral.
In effect, these supply chain networks reduce the costs of contracting in thick
markets by supporting a reputation market, which in turn reduces the search
costs associated with finding new contracting partners.64
Both the trade association and supply chain networks form around or are
formed by a governance structure that exercises some control over the
coordinating efforts in the network. These structures deploy standard contractual
mechanisms—whether in the form of a framework agreement in the case of the
auto industry or a bureaucratic contractual structure in the case of trade
associations—that support network collaboration. These relationships have a
“spider” at the center of the network that facilitates coordination.65 Other
networks, however, lack a controlling structure; they are webs without any spider.
Examples include the sovereign debt and corporate bond markets, as well as the
proliferation of strategic alliances in technology-intensive settings.66 These
62. U.S. automobile makers such as General Motors, who acquired suppliers in the 1920s, were
often invoked to illustrate the imperatives of vertical integration. Yet today in every sector of the
economy, including especially the automobile industry, we see vertical integration replaced by supply
chains linked together by previously unknown forms of collaborative contracting.
63. In the last several years, as market conditions have improved generally, GM has successfully
introduced a fundamentally new regime of contract governance with its suppliers, based on the kinds of
information sharing and review that are key to innovative collaboration under uncertainty. See Bob
Trebilcock, How They Did It: Supplier Trust at General Motors, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REV. (2017),
http://bt.e-ditionsbyfry.com/publication/?m=24891&i=408179&view=articleBrowser&article_
id=2783132&ver=html5 [https://perma.cc/VX2M-EJSD].
64. The unchallenged assumption over many years has been that these information networks are
entirely benign, providing valuable resources to network participants with no negative effects. Recently,
however, Matt Jennejohn has shown that in high technology settings the network is also a source of
offsetting costs, as valuable intellectual property rights can bleed out of a collaboration between two
contracting parties and into the network at large. See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of
Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 291–94 (2016); Matthew Jennejohn, Do Networks Govern
Contracts? 8–12 (Working Paper, 2019) [hereinafter Jennejohn, Do Networks Govern Contracts?].
65. Porat & Scott, supra note 11, at 15–16.
66. Strategic alliance networks act as conduits for the flow of private information about resources
and capabilities. The knowledge that is created by the information exchange within the individual
alliances diffuses throughout the network. Thus, the network becomes a reservoir of all the informational
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“spiderless” networks have fewer legal mechanisms to control the agency costs
and free-riding risks that impede coordination efforts. As a consequence, the
evidence shows that spiderless networks are fragile and often fail to solve
collective action problems readily, despite the evident benefits to network
members from inter-firm cooperation.67
C. Regulatory Networks
When the level of uncertainty is very high, coordinating around common
goals becomes even more challenging. Contracting parties are unsure about the
correct approach to a problem common to all, and network formation may
require the assistance of an external coordinating agent. Here is where we may
see the active participation of the state in coordinating efforts to form a
“regulatory network.” The aim of such a regulatory regime is to organize joint
exploration of possibilities for joint problem solving. In this sense, the problem is
the thick market analogue to bilateral contracting in uncertain markets,68 but with
scale now making possible public facilitation of collaboration. This pattern is
especially suited to efforts to mitigate exogenous risks that can only be addressed
through exacting, common efforts by all market participants.69
Food safety illustrates the class of risk that induces formation of this type of
regulatory network.70 A particularly salient example is the U.S. leafy greens
market, comprised of numerous highly diverse farms growing lettuce, spinach,
and related produce, and the large wholesaler-processors who buy their output.
Because produce from a single farm is combined with produce of other farms for
distribution, contamination at a single farm can lead to disease outbreaks that
affect overall consumption, and hence significantly reduce the sales for all parties.
All the parties in the food supply chain—growers, processors, distributors, and
value that accumulates within that particular sphere of economic activity. The protype of these strategic
alliances is the biotech network consisting of a university or research entity, a number of biotech
companies, large pharmaceutical firms, and venture capital firms. Balaji R. Koka & John E. Prescott,
Designing Alliance Networks: The Influence of Network Position, Environmental Change and Strategy on
Firm Performance, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 639, 640 (2008). See also Michael Hergert & Desmond
Morris, Trends in International Collaborative Agreements, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 99 (Farok J. Contractor & Peter Lorange eds., 1988) (analyzing the
increasing use of collaborative agreements between international partners); David T. Robinson & Toby
E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 242, 245 (2006)
(stating that over 5,500 alliances between dedicated biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical firms, and
universities have been formed since the mid-1970s).
67. Porat & Scott, supra note 11, at 15–16. For a contemporary illustration of the failure of parties
in the large, spiderless bio-tech network to organize successfully to solve vexing spillover problems that
cannot be addressed through bilateral contracting, see Jennejohn, Do Networks Govern Contracts?,
supra note 64.
68. See supra discussion in Part II.A.
69. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 70–73 (2014) (discussing how parties “can
take advantage of economies of scale to design a legally sophisticated interpretive regime”).
70. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a
Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1274–85 (2012)
(detailing the recent evolution of food regulation in the United States).
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retailers—therefore have an interest in protecting their market by developing a
network that reduces the chances for contamination. And the state, as the
protector of public health, has complementary interests. However, the actors in
this industry did not form a single community, and that diversity of interest made
coordination and effective collective action infeasible without the assistance of
regulatory entities.71
In 2007, after an outbreak of illness, the Food and Drug Administration
embarked on a program to encourage and assist state and private efforts in
building a contractual network for leafy greens.72 The California growers’
association, collectively accounting for roughly ninety-nine percent of California
leafy green production,73 petitioned the state to recognize a proposed Marketing
Agreement.74 The master contract that created the network designates safety
standards that require growers and processors to prepare plans for identifying all
hazardous control points and to detail the steps they have taken to mitigate the
hazard.75 Members must commit to a monitoring and reporting regime to verify
the efficacy of any precautionary actions that are undertaken.76 The network
relies on informal enforcement: the members commit to deal only with farms that
comply with the contract’s standards.77 As in the case of low-uncertainty
networks, such as the cotton industry trade associations, the ultimate sanction for
noncompliance with formal procedures is suspension or withdrawal of a
recalcitrant member’s right to use a service mark.78 In this way, the statesanctioned Marketing Agreement provides the coordinating function crucial to
the success of the regulatory network.

71. Id. at 1287.
72. Marian Burros, F.D.A. Offers Guidelines to Fresh-Food Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/washington/13fda.html [https://perma.cc/39P5-RSR6]. The agency
also pointed to insufficient enforcement resources. Id.
73. See Proposed National Marketing Agreement Regulating Leafy Green Vegetables, 76 Fed. Reg.
24,292 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011); see also Varun Shekhar, Produce Exceptionalism: Examining the Leafy
Greens Marketing Agreement [LGMA] and its Ability to Improve Food Safety, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 267
(2010) (evaluating the benefits and weaknesses of the LGMA in ensuring food safety).
74. California production, in turn, accounts for about seventy-five percent of national production.
CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS HANDLER MARKETING AGREEMENT
(2015), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/mkt/pdf/LeafyGreensProductsHandlerMktAgmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KL6N-CFQ6]. The growers were acting under the authority of a state marketing act
that confers antitrust immunity for various purposes on organizations of agricultural producers. Sabel &
Simon, supra note 70, at 1280.
75. See CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS HANDLER MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 74, at art.
V (requiring members to maintain a “trace-back system” subject to verification, inspection, and
compliance reports).
76. See id. (discussing the requirement that members must follow the Agreement’s Best Practices in
order to use the official Service Mark of the Agreement). See generally CAL. LEAFY GREEN PRODS.
HANDLER MKTG. BD., COMMODITY SPECIFIC FOOD SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR THE PRODUCTION AND
HARVEST OF LETTUCE AND LEAFY GREENS (2011),
http://www.leafygreenguidance.com/book/
export/html/1 [https://perma.cc/5HQH-AECL] (containing various provisions that impose recordkeeping requirements on signatory handlers).
77. CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS HANDLER MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 74, at art. V.
78. Id.
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The networks just described have been formed to address a variety of
common risks, including, but certainly not limited to, the inefficiencies of
standardized contract terms that have plagued the sovereign debt market and
have also affected (perhaps to a lesser extent) the corporate bond market.79 The
trade associations studied by Bernstein illustrate how consistent updating and
private enforcement can optimize the tradeoff between efficient contracting and
efficient contract production. Other networks coordinate to solve different
problems, as seen in the case of supply chains. As levels of uncertainty increase,
common problems range from the use of networks to acquire information about
potential partners in a rapidly changing environment to the prevention of latent
defects through a public-private regulatory intervention. The common theme in
all of these examples is that successful networks can reduce the costs of deficient
contract design in multilateral environments.
In Part IV, I take up the normative question, asking whether the mechanisms
that have improved the efficiency of contracting in the multilateral markets
discussed above can offer fresh insights on a problem that has thus far largely
defied consensus solution: how best to regulate thick market consumer
transactions and reduce the contracting inefficiencies that can be used to exploit
consumer ignorance.
IV
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER
MARKETS
A. The Failure of the Unitary Regime of Contract Law
The paradox of contracting in markets leads one to rethink familiar forms of
contracting and to challenge the limitations of conventional understandings of
contract. Of these conceptual limits, none is more fundamental (and perverse)
than the idea that vastly different agreements—such as those between two large
manufacturing firms, issuers and holders of corporate bonds, or retail sellers and
individual consumers—are all similar enough to be treated as a single conception
of contract. Yet, under traditional legal principles, all bespoke bilateral contracts
between firms, all multilateral debt contracts, and all internet-based consumer
contracts are governed by a unitary regime of contract law.
This paradigm of the unitary, bilateral contract—derived from the common
law of contract as it developed after the industrial revolution—has dominated
contemporary analysis of consumer markets. Yet the paradigm has yielded only
a single point of agreement: none of the current approaches to reducing the risk

79. Choi, Scott & Gulati, supra note 47, at 26–29; see also Glen D. West & Natalie Smeltzer,
Protecting The Integrity of the Entity-Specific Contract: The “No Recourse Against Others” Clause—
Missing or Ineffective Boilerplate?, 67 BUS. LAW. 39 (2012) (arguing that a failure of the corporate bond
market to coordinate around a revision to the standard “no recourse against others” clause risks
significant liability for creditors issuing corporate bonds).
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of exploitation in consumer transactions have worked.80 If there is any consensus,
it is that disclosure does not work well in consumer markets because information
overload deters consumers from assessing the many different terms offered to
them in the standardized contracts used in consumer transactions.81 Beyond that
pessimistic consensus, there is no agreement on the problem and therefore no
agreement on possible solutions to the problem of inefficient and exploitative
terms in consumer contracts.
B. Reconceiving Consumer Transactions as Multilateral Contracting
To make some headway, we must first see if we can reframe the problem. The
core difficulty is that many scholars continue to think of consumer transactions
using the bilateral contracting framework that applies to bespoke agreements in
thin markets. But despite calls by academics for more common law rules that will
equip courts with the tools to police consumer contracts,82 no such developments
have occurred. One reason, surely, is that courts are peculiarly ill-suited to the
task. The first step, therefore, is to recognize that contract doctrine created and
applied to bilateral and bespoke contracting has little relevance for ameliorating
problems in thick, multilateral consumer markets. All the available empirical
evidence suggests that the problem that occupied consumer advocates fifty years
ago—grossly exploitative terms in fine print in bilateral agreements between
individual consumers and retail sellers—is no longer the most pressing concern.83
The contemporary reality is the proliferation of “rolling contracts,” where key
terms and conditions of the agreement often follow rather than precede the
decision to purchase a product, and internet transactions where “click-wrap” and
“browse-wrap” terms lead consumers to accept contracts without any
examination of their content.84 These consumer transactions occur in multilateral
80. See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
81. See Omri Ben Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
647 (2011) (discussing many ways of showing the failure of mandated disclosure).
82. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 197–216 (2013) (arguing for using tort law rather than contract in certain cases as part of
a broad oversight of boilerplate clauses by courts, legislators, and regulatory agencies); see also Robert
A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” in Contract Law and the Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV.
879 (1999); Ralph Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 11 31 (1995).
83. The paradigmatic case of judicial review of abusive terms in bilateral consumer contracts is
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). There are several reasons why
clauses such as the fine print, unintelligible cross-collateral clause in Williams are no longer the central
focus of regulation. Market forces control some of the more venial abusive practices in bilateral consumer
contracts. More importantly, however, the vast majority of states have enacted retail installment sales
acts that have prohibited the worst examples of abusive practices. Retail installment sales acts preclude
signing contracts in blank, require disclosure of credit terms, provide for cooling off periods, prohibit
balloon payments and add on clauses, and regulate prepayment penalties. See, e.g., Retail Installment
Sales Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:16C-1 (2013). In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has outlawed
purchase money security interests in household goods and has prevented finance companies from
claiming holder in due course status to insulate them from warranty claims against the consumer paper
that they purchase. See 16 C.F.R. Part 433 (1977); 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1984).
84. “Click-wrap” refers to terms presented to consumers in fine print requiring acceptance by
clicking “I agree” prior to entering the website. “Browse-wrap” refers to websites that list the terms in
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markets where, as I have argued above, production efficiency inevitably leads to
inefficient contract terms.
There is some evidence that scholars who study consumer transactions are
attempting to shift the paradigm away from the classic bilateral contract in which
each party assents to terms presented by the other. The proposed Restatement
of the Law of Consumer Contracts abandons the fiction of mutual assent in
consumer contracting and substitutes instead the ex post regulation of abusive
terms.85 Unfortunately, the drafters then propose to rely on the doctrine of
unconscionability, returning once again to the bilateral paradigm by asking
common law courts to identify exploitative terms in litigation.86 But the history
of the unconscionability doctrine provides little hope that this proposal will root
out inherent inefficiencies caused by standardization.87 Moreover, even the
modest acknowledgment in the proposed Restatement that the common law
paradigm is inapposite to consumer transactions has provoked a sharp response:
the widespread negative reaction of consumer advocates to the proposed
abandonment of the concept of assent is the best evidence of the continuing
power of the bilateral frame.88
To be sure, all markets, including thick ones, are not barriers to fraud or
abusive behavior short of fraud, but there is little evidence that abuse of market
power is the major problem in multilateral consumer contracts characterized by

other parts of the site and require consumers to click that they have read and agreed to them. The data
show that in neither case do consumers read the terms. In fact, the typical time before a consumer clicks
“I agree” is one second. For a review of the empirical literature, see Florencia Moratta-Wurgler, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2
(2014).
85. See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, cmt. 13 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft,
2019) (arguing that while the mutual assent doctrine was once “a meaningful mechanism” to protect
consumers, the ubiquity of standard-form contracts has “diluted the effectiveness and plausibility of such
front end self-protection”).
86. Id. § 5, cmt. 1.
87. The majority of states, for example, require a showing of both substantive and procedural
unconscionability. Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How
State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 767
(2014). This means that a plaintiff must demonstrate both that its counterparty engaged in unfair
bargaining practices, such as including terms in extremely fine print, and that the resulting contract was
unfair. Id. at 768–70. The standard response of sellers has been to draft their standard contract terms in
larger fonts, using capital letters to highlight salient legal language. The further problem, of course, is
that consumers must recognize that they have the legal right to seek redress for an unconscionable
contract. Recent experimental evidence suggests that consumers may fail to pursue legitimate claims
owing to a misplaced belief that unfair terms are legally permissible. Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna
Sommers, Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 20), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378353
[https://perma.cc/FL82-XW8S].
88. Following the promulgation of the Draft Restatement, twenty-three Attorneys General sent a
letter to the membership of the American Law Institute urging the members to reject the proposed
Restatement owing to its abandonment of the concept of assent. See Letter from Letitia James, Attorney
Gen. of N.Y., to the Membership of the Am. Law Inst., (May 14, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/
files/letter_to_ali_members.pdf [https://perma.cc/D895-EBMU]. Following this letter, little action was
taken on the proposed final draft in the May 2019 meeting of the American Law Institute.
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boilerplate terms.89 Rather, the problem in multilateral consumer markets, as in
multilateral markets generally, is that standardization produces deficient terms.
As predicted by the paradox set out above, many terms in standard-form
consumer contracts are either obsolete90 or, as found by the Reporters of the
proposed Restatement, encrusted with “unintelligible legalese.”91 Given the
gross information asymmetries between commercial sellers and consumer
buyers, the costs of those deficiencies are likely visited primarily on the
consumer. A major challenge, therefore, for any regulatory intervention in large
consumer markets is to distinguish these inefficient terms from those that
efficiently allocate risks between consumers and sellers. Such an inquiry is
peculiarly unsuited to judicial, common law determinations, but it is available to
regulators through well-conceived data-driven investigations.92
A further problem in consumer markets is salience. Psychological evidence
suggests that individuals selecting among alternatives are incapable of accurately
evaluating more than five to seven product attributes in any given transaction.93
But multilateral consumer contracts typically contain many more boilerplate
terms than the data suggest parties can intelligently evaluate. Each of these terms
describes product attributes or performance obligations that are functionally a
part of the product. Moreover, collective action problems that also exist on the
seller side of this multilateral market will motivate sellers to continue to produce
terms that contain these non-salient attributes, thereby permitting them to
compete on the salience of the price term. The challenge, then, is how to create
both clarity and salience in those terms that are most relevant to consumer
choice.94
89. See Florencia Moratta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The
Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447 (2008) (finding “little
evidence” that firms with market power “require consumers to accept particularly one sided terms”).
90. A classic example of an obsolete term is the folk story of the standard default insurance charge
in rental car contracts. Originally set for drivers as young as twenty-one, it has not been revised to reflect
the increase in the rental age to twenty-five. This add-on insurance is among the most expensive in terms
of risk and coverage available on the market. For a discussion of the inefficiencies of add-on insurance
products, see Tom Baker & Peter Seligman, “You Want Insurance with That?”; Using Behavioral
Economics to Protect Consumers from Add-on Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2013).
91. See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS, supra note 85, § 2, reporters’ notes (arguing
that “informed consent to the standard contract terms is, by and large, absent in the typical consumer
contract”). Encrustation that leads to the unintelligible language referenced on the Restatement draft
generates inefficiencies even when the original un-encrusted term is efficient. The loss of comprehension
aggravates the salience problem that consumers face when seeking to compare numerous and/or difficult
to understand contract terms.
92. See Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1524–31 (2019)
(using a large data study showing that legislative restrictions on bank overdrafts and credit card penalty
fees and interest rate increases did not result in a corresponding increase in consumer costs while caps
on debit interchange fees exacerbated the market failure it sought to correct).
93. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1227 (2003) (reviewing empirical research suggesting that “the number of
attributes decision-makers are likely to investigate . . . when choosing between alternatives is surprisingly
modest . . . perhaps as few as five”).
94. Several scholars have identified the significance of the salience problem and proposed different
solutions. Russell Korobkin suggests using the unconscionability doctrine to scrutinize non-salient terms
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How then should the state approach the problems of obsolete and encrusted
terms in consumer contracts, which the preceding analysis suggests will inevitably
be present in these multilateral markets? The problem that consumers face is
similar in kind to that facing the purchasers of sovereign or corporate debt. The
inability to coordinate around more efficient contract terms suggests that
consumers do not accurately price the terms they accept. Given the information
asymmetry assumption, those pricing errors are rents that producers capture in
these markets. Moreover, unlike the members of the cotton growers trade
association, there is no hierarchical institution that can serve as the spider in the
network whose task is to coordinate around more efficient terms. When the level
of uncertainty is very high, we have seen that network formation often requires
the introduction of an external coordinating agent. The answer in this class of
cases lies in the use of the state, not as a regulator of individual contracts, but as
the substitute spider. In this role, the state can coordinate efforts to produce more
efficient consumer contracts and relieve buyers in these markets of a
disproportionate burden of the costs inherent in the current process of producing
consumer contracts.
C. Templates for a Consumer Regulatory Network
The emerging regime in the European Union (E.U.) offers both a starting
point and a cautionary lesson for how to induce a regulatory network that
separates agreements deserving special scrutiny from contracts between legally
sophisticated parties.95 The E.U. has chosen to separate contracts with consumers
from the larger body of general contract law and to regulate consumer markets
through several directives coordinating standards of consumer protection. A
central element of the E.U.’s consumer contract regime is the Directive on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts, which contains a non-exhaustive, “gray” list of
seventeen potentially unfair contract terms.96 Similarly, the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive lists “commercial practices which are in all circumstances
considered unfair” to the consumer.97 The aim here is to establish rules of
commercial good conduct for evaluating standard-form consumer contracts
where consumers may be especially vulnerable to exploitation; to ban
standardized terms that serve only the interests of one party to the transaction;
and to do this without affecting the contract law that generally governs
agreements between commercial parties. Unfortunately, there are still important
gaps in the E.U.’s regime. The most significant is the absence of a comprehensive
and reliable mechanism for updating the lists of prohibited and suspect
in standardized consumer contracts. Id. at 1256–66. Ian Ayers and Alan Schwartz propose a novel
experiment to aid regulators in identifying and then highlighting the most salient terms. Ian Ayers &
Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552–54
(2014). Natasha Sarin argues that well designed regulatory interventions, including a “salience shock,”
can work to overcome the salience problem. Sarin, supra note 92, at 1560–68.
95. This part draws on Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 21, at 75–86.
96. Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, annex, 1993 O.J. (L 95).
97. Council Directive 2005/29/EC, annex I, 2005 O.J. (L 149).
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boilerplate contract terms.98 Without a mechanism for systematic, continued
review and update, there is both the risk that inefficient boilerplate terms take
hold before they are clearly condemned and that the enforcement of restrictions
that lose their relevance to consumer protection will burden commerce.99
Developing a method of updating any regulatory intervention is critical,
therefore, to the successful introduction of a spider in the web. Updating is the
cornerstone of an experimentalist commitment to regulatory intervention.100 The
best evidence of which kinds of interventions will or will not succeed is the
experience gained from initial efforts to solve the collective action problems that
lead to obsolete and exploitative terms. A system of updating provides a means
of benchmarking from past successes and failures and, not incidentally, offers
additional benefits in ensuring that regulatory interventions are subject to a form
of “sunsetting” that compels abandonment of unsuccessful interventions.101
Notwithstanding its limitations, the E.U. regime does illustrate how courts
might function in a multilateral consumer network. Here, the national courts of
the member states play a quasi-administrative function—drawing the attention
of home-state regulators to possibly unfair terms. In turn, the European Court of
Justice acts as a judicial backstop, correcting unintended consequences of the
network.102 This regulatory network differs from conventional adjudication by
treating each case not only as a matter of fairness to an individual claimant, but
also as a potential indication of systemic failure and an opportunity for
improvement for all consumers in the particular market. By establishing a similar
quasi-administrative regime through appropriate state or federal legislation,
American contract law could accomplish two critically important goals: first,
regulating standardized consumer transactions more effectively and
appropriately; and second, freeing sophisticated commercial parties from
constraints that are inapt to their circumstances.

98. In 2008, the E.U. did try to incorporate a sophisticated updating mechanism into a proposed
revision of Directive 93/13. This mechanism would have enlisted courts in the task of updating the register
of impermissible terms without empowering the courts to routinely question the express meaning of
agreements so as to undercut the autonomy of commercial parties to design contracts free from such
regulation. But resistance by the European Parliament to the committee updating procedure and by
consumer groups against corresponding limitations on the right of member states to supplement E.U.
consumer protections doomed this proposal. Instead, the Consumer Rights Directive of 2010 includes no
updating mechanism. Id. at 77–80.
99. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that the absence of an updating mechanism in the E.U.
directive has led to a proliferation of ill-conceived “suspect” terms. See Przemysław Pałka, Research
Scholar & Fellow in Private Law, Comments at The Market as a Legal Construct Symposium at Yale
Law School (Sept. 21, 2019).
100. See Charles Sabel & William Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54–56 (2011) (arguing for governance mechanisms that compensate for the
absence of ex ante knowledge).
101. See, e.g., David L. Weimer, Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics, and Habits: Ten
Concepts for Policy Design, 25 POL’Y SCI. 135, 152 (1992) (“[O]nce routines become established, making
major program changes becomes difficult. Therefore, the possibility of error should be anticipated in
policy designs by creating mechanisms for its detection and correction.”).
102. See, e.g., Case C-412/06, Annelore Hamilton v. Volksbank Filder eG, 2008 E.C.R. I-02383.
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It may yet be possible to apply the lessons learned from the E.U. example to
the formation of a consumer contract regulatory network in the United States
even in the absence of encompassing legislation to that effect. For example,
considerable authority to regulate terms in consumer markets is currently
embodied in both the legislation creating the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) and the authority of the new CFPB and the Federal Trade
Commission to regulate “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts and practices.”103 As
the preceding discussion suggests, the baseline for determining reasonable
boilerplate terms in any given consumer market cannot come from generalist
courts. The information needed to answer this question can, however, be
developed through the rule-making process of administrative agencies charged
with the task of regulating transactions in particular markets.
A particularly salient example of just such a process is the action by the CFPB
in issuing a model “plain language” form for credit card contracts.104 Importantly,
use of the model form is not mandatory for banks and other entities that extend
credit to consumers. Rather, the use of a model form provides a safe harbor for
creditors or lessors.105 Thus, it is conceived as a default from which the regulated
entities may depart at their option. From the vantage point of the claim here—
that multilateral contracts are inevitably obsolete and encrusted—this safe
harbor approach is an even more valuable tool than its advocates realized
initially. The conventional justification offered in support of a safe harbor
standard-form contract is that the use of officially blessed terms functions as a
nudge to induce parties to conform to best practices.106 But a safe harbor
regulatory strategy functions even more importantly to eliminate deficient terms,
whether obsolete or encrusted or both, in the course of formulating the model
form. The objective, then, is not to impose the terms and conditions of consumer

103. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2018). An official report by the CFPB describes this project in the following
terms:
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will aim to bring clarity to the marketplace. A fair,
efficient, and transparent market depends upon consumers’ ability to compare the costs,
benefits, and risks of different products effectively and to use that information to choose the
product that is best for them. Fine print and overly long agreements can make it difficult for
consumers to understand and compare products, and that obstacle to sound markets is not
removed by disclosures that are too complicated or that do not focus on the key information
consumers need. The principal role of consumer protection regulation in credit markets is to
make it easy for consumers to see what they are getting and to compare one product with
another, so that markets can function effectively.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 10 (July 18, 2011).
104. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 INTEGRATED MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE
RULE UNDER THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (REGULATION X) AND THE TRUTH
IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/
final-rules/2013-integrated-mortgage-disclosure-rule-under-real-estate-settlement-procedures-actregulation-x-and-truth-lending-act-regulation-z/ [https://perma.cc/6B94-G7X3].
105. 15 U.S.C § 1604(b) (2018).
106. For much more on nudges, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009).

FINAL - SCOTT (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2020]

THE PARADOX OF CONTRACTING IN MARKETS

6/26/2020 4:00 PM

97

contracts but rather to provide a continuously updated baseline of efficient terms
against which existing practices can be measured.
The safe harbor contract form also helps to inform the empirical question that
courts have been unable to answer successfully in adjudicating unconscionability
claims in bilateral disputes: Is the disputed term “oppressive” or “unreasonably
favorable” to one of the parties?107 Unmoored standards such as these cry out for
a baseline, and courts have time and again declined to intervene because they do
not have one.108 What a generalist court can do, however, is assess the facts in
individual disputes and measure the distance between a regulatory baseline and
the contractual terms and conditions in a disputed contract. By asking courts to
engage in this more limited role, a jurisprudence of legally significant deviations
from the baseline can emerge over time. That experience, in turn, would inform
the updating mechanism by which the relevant agency revises the baseline in light
of the new information revealed in litigation. In this way, the underlying
empirical realities can be continually revised to better balance the interests of
both the merchant seller and the class of consumers in the particular market being
regulated. The use of model terms and conditions as baselines for litigation is an
interpretive strategy that easily can be adopted by interpretive bodies other than
the CFPB, in particular the Federal Trade Commission, that can deploy their
rule-making authority to develop the empirical foundation of the standards for
efficient contracting in other multilateral markets with similar characteristics.109
If updating is an essential element in revising inefficient standard terms, then
it follows that nimble administrative agencies rather than legislative enactments
are the mode of state intervention best able to solve the collective action problem
in multilateral consumer markets. Indeed, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) offers a cautionary lesson in how legislation can instantiate
standardized default terms under circumstances in which subsequent revision is
precluded.110 A drafter-supplied solution to a contracting problem that is efficient
when initially supplied may subsequently become obsolete when the particular
contracting problem requires a different solution. Article 2 took its current form
in 1952 and, following the failure of a twenty-year effort to revise its obsolete
terms in 2011, no further efforts to update its defaults are contemplated.
Commercial behavior, however, is in important respects different from the

107. See supra note 5.
108. See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 5, at 507–08 (finding that the relatively few cases in which courts
have struck down bargains as unconscionable require both procedural and substantive
unconscionability).
109. For a similar suggestion using the Federal Trade Commission to provide the empirical basis for
identifying fair terms in consumer contracts, see Ayers & Schwartz, supra note 94, at 552–54.
110. In previous work, I have criticized the public goods rationale for supplying private agents with
contract terms because legislative drafters may lack the information to make efficient interventions. For
discussion, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contracts and the Default Rule
Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2016). The information problem arises whenever a standard common law
default becomes obsolete and the drafters for the state consider replacing the default with a more current
term.
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behavior that was current seventy or more years ago. Consequently, many of the
older default solutions in the U.C.C. are now obsolete.
The U.C.C. default terms governing sellers’ warranties provide an instructive
example. The U.C.C. primarily regulates quality issues with the implied warranty
of merchantability: Goods must be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which they
are used” and “pass without objection in the trade.”111 This standardized default
was efficient when sellers traded homogenous standard goods to large numbers
of similarly situated buyers. The warranty of merchantability is no longer
efficient, however, because many sellers today trade heterogeneous—that is,
customized—goods to buyers with particular needs. Consequently, sellers today
commonly disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability.112 The effect of the
disclaimer is to shift some of the risk of quality defects to buyers, including
consumer buyers. However, even though the U.C.C.’s solution no longer fits,
parties still face quality issues and the need for a term to regulate them. And the
same collective action problem that required state intervention in the first
instance now precludes the parties in this multilateral market from designing an
efficient solution. The lesson for state actors is that any failure to update a statesanctioned default that was designed to replace an inefficient term in a
standardized consumer contract inevitably creates a new contractual gap that will
be filled with a new boilerplate term that is generated by the same market forces
that the default was designed to correct.
V
CONCLUSION
Theory holds that parties pursue two separate economic objectives when
contracting: First, they seek to design contractual incentives that motivate
efficient ex ante investment in the contract and efficient trade ex post. Second,
they seek to efficiently produce the contract terms that implement their design
strategies. Because these goals are in tension, and because contracting occurs in
markets with particular characteristics, parties inevitably trade off one objective
against the other in very different ways. What I have called the paradox of
contracting in markets is a way of illustrating the distinct trade-offs and the
consequences that result from changes in the character of the market in which a
contract is made. In bilateral markets, where parties cannot exploit the benefits
of standardization, optimization leads to more efficient design at the cost of
inefficient production. Here, parties optimize production costs by shifting costs
between the front and back end of the contracting process depending on the
levels of uncertainty they face. In contrast, contract terms are produced more

111. U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
112. In addition, parties routinely opt out of the Code’s consequential damages default rule. In place
of both the warranty and damages default term, parties create complex repair-and-replacement
provisions that strive to allocate the risks of product defects in other ways. See Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 18, at 1578.
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efficiently in thick, multilateral markets, but at the cost of deficient design. The
paradox derives from the inherent nature of standardization: production
efficiency inevitably comes at the cost of individualized design.
The causal link between efficient production and deficient design would be
manageable in contracting, as it is in other spheres of commercial life, but for the
stranglehold on our imaginations created by the unitary conception of contract
law. This paradigm impedes efforts to understand the singular challenges the
state confronts in facilitating contracting in different market circumstances. In
bilateral markets, the state can safely rely on courts to ensure that bargains are
free and fair, presuming that with those conditions satisfied enforcement will
correspond to the parties’ ex ante intentions.113 Thick multilateral markets
present a different problem for state regulation. In some multilateral markets
where standardization results in terms that impair contractual incentives, the
parties themselves have been able to organize a network to ameliorate the
problems of deficient contract design. But in very large markets—webs without
a spider—that coordination is very costly and may not be achieved solely through
private efforts. Here, the state can serve as the partner in facilitating the
coordination needed to mitigate latent risks. Theory tells us, then, that such a
regulatory network is the most promising solution to the vexing problem of
eliminating the inevitable problems of obsolescence and encrustation in
consumer markets.

113. See generally Jody P. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, The Case Against Equity in American Contract
Law, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper Series No. 609,
2019).

